Does subjectivism in value theory – the view that value is grounded on
attitudes – imply that when we think and talk about what is good and
bad we must necessarily be thinking and talking about our desires and
other attitudes? • Does value subjectivism entail that evaluative utterances
are reports or expressions of the speaker’s attitude? • Are subjectivists
committed to an axiology according to which only preference satisfaction
is valuable for its own sake? • Are subjectivists disqualified from
talking about intrinsic value? • Is it a consequence of subjectivism that
if we had different attitudes than those that we in fact have different
things would be valuable? • Is subjectivism a view on which things can
be good or bad only by being good or bad for particular people? • Are
subjectivists committed to objectionable forms of relativism or egoism?
• Is every form of idealization of attitudes in tension with the spirit of
subjectivism? • Is subjectivism a bleak view on which nothing matters?
In Value Grounded on Attitudes – Subjectivism in Value Theory, Fritz-
Anton Fritzson defends subjectivist views against some common objections
and offers a sympathetic formulation of value subjectivism.